Abstract
1 We use tatonnement model and Walrasian hypothesis interchangeably to refer to a model that predicts prices adjust in proportion to excess demand. We use tatonnement institution to refer to a market institution where prices are centrally adjusted according to excess demand and trade only occurs at equilibrium prices. There have been several other experimental tests of the Walrasian hypothesis. Smith (1962) finds some support for it although the "excess rent" hypothesis he introduces does better. Crockett et al. (2011) find support for the Walrasian hypothesis in an experimental study of Gale's (1963) economy.
2 While the Scarf economy is an idealized example whose conditions are unlikely to be met in practice, this type of disequilibrium behavior is akin to price cycles observed in some important commodity markets, see for example Cashin and McDermott (2002) .
3 A large market is not a necessary condition for price-taking behavior to be optimal, see e.g. Ostroy (1980) . 4 Submitting demand schedules is a common feature of electricity markets, IPOs, and treasury auctions. Furthermore, this procedure is used prior to the start of the New York Stock Exchange to provide the opening prices for the day. Schedule markets are understudied compared to the double auction market, but an early laboratory test is reported by Smith et al. (1982) who consider a single-commodity market for which stability is not an issue. They find that a schedule market produces efficiency levels similar to those observed in the double auction market.
quantities traded and hence welfare. It is based on Hahn and Negishi's (1962) model of much like they are not able to find the competitive equilibrium by reasoning in the 23 double auction market. Furthermore, previous studies have found that people do not 24 always play weakly dominant strategies. In individual decision making tasks where the 25 weakly dominant strategy may appear obvious, subjects often do not behave optimally 26 (Cason and Plott, 2014) . In second-price auctions, subjects typically overbid relative to 27 their values. In call markets, subjects are often insensitive to whether sincere bidding 28 is a weakly dominant strategy and tend to initially bid further from their true value 29 than optimal (Cason and Friedman, 1997) . Instead of assuming that weakly dominant 30 strategies are necessarily played, we consider the assumption that subjects use a myopic 31 strategy of submitting a schedule that is a best response to the previously observed price 32 but more elastic or more inelastic than the competitive schedule. We prove that under 33 5 There are some other notable models with trading at non-equilibrium prices. Keisler (1995; 1996) introduces a model with decentralized price setting. There is a single market maker who holds an inventory and sets prices. Agents are randomly selected to trade with the market maker. The market maker adjusts prices in such a way that his inventory remains approximately constant over time. Crockett et al. (2008) augment the zero-intelligence trading model with a learning rule that directs convergence to competitive equilibrium. They consider an infinite-horizon model where, in each period, out-ofequilibrium trade yields an allocation in the contract set. The utility gradient at that allocation is then interpreted as a price vector that is used to redistribute wealth to generate a new starting allocation for the next period. The model is a globally stable alternative to Walras' tatonnement. See also Crockett (2008) for an experimental test of the model. 6 Indeed, there is a large literature on supply function equilibria that studies oligopolistic markets where firms choose supply schedules and do not necessarily face a flat residual demand curve, see for instance, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) . Importantly, however, in large economies, the supply curve faced by each agent is approximately flat for arbitrary specifications of preferences and endowments. As a result, submitting competitive schedules is optimal more generally when the economy grows large.
stationary repetition, prices gradually converge to the competitive equilibrium. The next section briefly reviews the tatonnement adjustment process and shows that 3 it is unstable in Scarf's (1960) economy. Section 3 describes the issues in designing a 4 stable market mechanism and puts forth a specific proposal. Section 4 describes the 5 design of an experiment that compares this novel mechanism to the standard double Consider a type A agent who is endowed with one apple and has utility function min(q A , q B ).
16
For given prices p A and p B this agent's demands for apples and bananas are q A = q B = 17 p A p A +p B . Notice that there are income effects, i.e. agent A's demands for both apples and 18 bananas rise (fall) when the price of apples (bananas) goes up. The demands for type 19 B and C agents can be derived similarly, and it is readily verified that the equilibrium 20 prices for which demand equals supply satisfy p A = p B = p C . Without loss of generality 21 we can single out coconuts to be the numeraire good and fix its price to p C = 1. Then 22 the competitive equilibrium price of each of the goods is one. 23 How does the economy arrive at competitive equilibrium prices? Consider any set of 24 prices p A and p B for apples and bananas respectively expressed in terms of the numeraire 25 p C = 1. In Walras' tatonnement process, the change of price of each good is equal to its 26 excess demand. In vector notation, dp(t)/dt = z(p), or written out in components 27 dp A dt = n 1 1 + p A − p B p A + p B dp B dt = n p A p A + p B − 1 1 + p B where n ≥ 1 is the number of replicas of each type of agent in the economy. In the 28 first line, the first term between parentheses on the right-hand side is the demand for 29 apples by type C and the second term is the net supply of apples by type A. Likewise, 1 in the second line, the first term between parentheses represents the demand for bananas 2 by agent A and the second term is the net supply of bananas by type B. The price of 3 coconuts is fixed at 1 so there is no price adjustment equation for p C .
4
Proposition 1. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, the tatonnement 5 process is globally unstable. Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function
It is readily verified that 0 ≤ L ≤ 1 with L = 0 if and only if p A = p B = 1. Moreover,
8
using the tatonnement equations of motion we have
In other words, the Lyapunov function is constant over time. Smale (1976a Smale ( , 1976b proposes to replace the Walrasian tatonnement process, dp(t)/dt = 17 z(p), by the Newtonian dynamic:
with ∇z(p) the matrix of partial derivatives of z(p) with respect to p.
Proposition 2. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, the Newtonian 20 dynamic is globally stable.
21
7 Newton's method for solving f (x) = 0 for some f : R → R can be recovered by taking a discrete approximation:
8 In writing down the global Newton dynamic we assumed that ∇z(p) is everywhere non-singular, which is true for the Scarf example. Smale (1976b) discusses a more general form of the Newtonian dynamic that applies also when ∇z(p) is singular.
9 Written out in components, (∇z(p)) ij = ∂z i (p)/∂p j . 
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function
Note that 0 ≤ L ≤ 1 and L = 0 if and only if p A = p B = 1. The Newtonian laws of 2 motion for the Scarf economy
Hence, the Lyapunov function decreases exponentially over time to its limit value of zero, 5 corresponding to the competitive equilibrium (see the right panel of Figure 1 ). negative, prices will not converge to the competitive equilibrium as illustrated in Figure   37 2c. Finally, for the price adjustment rule where the price of a good is increased by a 38 fixed increment if excess demand for the good is strictly positive and decreased by a fixed 39 10 Convergence in single-commodity markets occurs under a wide variety of conditions, see e.g. Smith (1962) , Friedman (1984) , and Smith (2010).
11 See Smith et al. (1982) and Plott and George (1992) for experimental evidence on the Walrasian auctioneer mechanism. amount if excess demand for the good is strictly negative, prices will also not converge 1 as illustrated in Figure 2d . Stephen Smale on "global Newton" methods. Smale (1976a; 1976b) 12 The global instability observed in the experiments conducted by Anderson et al. (2004) indicates that the Newtonian dynamic is not at play in the double auction market institution. In a related set of double auction market experiments, Hirota et al. 2005 report that they find no support for the Newtonian model. 13 Newton's classical method of iteration corresponds to a discrete approximation to Smale's adjustment process.
14 Notice that a Walraisan Clearing House (Friedman and Rust, 1993 , p. 9) where traders submit demand schedules but a tatonnement dynamic is applied to the resultant aggregate demand function would not help. Eliciting demand using schedules rather than iteratively does not solve the instability problem.
15 McCabe et al. (1990) found that call market based institutions can be highly efficient. Friedman (1993) compares the continuous double auction to a call market institution and finds they produce similar efficiency levels. 16 In the experiment, participants only report demand at a finite set of prices and interpolation is used to estimate demand at intermediate prices. The interpolation method is described in Section 4.2.
positive prices to strictly positive quantities. The following restrictions are applied to 1 the submitted demand schedules.
The first restriction states that demand schedules are non-increasing. The second re-5 striction states that demand is inelastic, i.e. the amount spent on a good rises with its 6 price. We say a schedule is admissible if it satisfies properties (D) and (I). It is readily 7 verified that admissibility is preserved under aggregation. In particular, let A be any set Define S YX (q) = qD fixed point, no trade occurs.) The amount of C being traded equals q C = S CA (q A ) since 
26
What constitutes an optimal admissible schedule given the schedules submitted by oth- 17 One might think a unique equilibrium could be achieved by restricting demand to be a decreasing function and supply to be an increasing function. Unfortunately, this would not allow traders to express their true preferences, because income effects in the Scarf economy result in downward sloping supply curves. The (D) and (I) admissiblity restrictions allow traders to express their true preferences while ruling out multiple equilibria. 18 Evaluating
, which is negative by the assumption of inelastic downward sloping demand.
19 Maximizing min(q X , q Y ) over the budget set
Type utility supplies demands submits schedule which is admissible. Call this the competitive schedule. The associated supply function optimal. But the supply function can also easily be expressed in terms of the relative
which is increasing for α > that submitting a competitive schedule is optimal now follows from the fact that the 27 elasticity of supply is less than −1 when it is decreasing. This implies that when the 28 type-A agent submits a schedule that gives her more B, she will have to pay more units 29 of A for it.
30
In Example 1, the argument that a competitive schedule is optimal for the type-A agent 1 does not depend on the particular functional form of others' schedules but only on the 2 fact that others' supply is increasing, which is more generally true if we impose admissi-3 bility.
4
Proposition 4. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, submitting a compet-5 itive schedule is a weakly dominant strategy when schedules are restricted to be admissible. arguments apply to agents of other types.
16
Without the admissibility restriction, the result does not hold; however all agents sub-17 mitting competitive schedules is a Nash equilibrium (see Appendix A).
18
The fact that each agent faces a flat supply curve is due to the specific parametrization generally when the economy grows large.
22
To explore the robustness of the mechanism, we consider a repeated market setting 
Notice thatD XY (p t−1 , p t−1 ) = andD AC (p t−1 , p) respectively, then prices will converge to the unique competitive equi-36 librium of the economy over successive periods. This result shows that the schedule market is somewhat forgiving to deviations from 1 submitting competitive schedules and that convergence to the unique competitive equi-2 librium of the Scarf economy over successive periods can occur even with myopic behavior. There were two treatments: the continuous double auction and the schedule market.
13
A total of 180 subjects participated in the experiment. There were 12 sessions with 14 one group of 15 subjects per session and six sessions per treatment. In a group, five 15 subjects were assigned to each of the three types. Subjects were given the endowments 16 and utility functions shown in Table 2 and were told that they would be paid the value of 17 their holdings after trading, where the value was calculated using their utility functions.
18
There were three unpaid practice periods and 15 paid periods. 20 At the start of each 19 period, endowments were refreshed, no goods were carried over from one period to the 20 next.
21
At the beginning of the experiment, the instructions were presented using PowerPoint The experiment took around 1.5 hours to complete.
The double auction market Session 2 lasted for only ten periods because of a computer crash. 21 The user interface for both market mechanisms was tailored to Leontief preferences, but it could easily be adjusted to accommodate more general preferences over a pair of goods. For instance, if constant elasticity of substitution utility functions were used, the 'Unused' columns could be replaced by columns showing the marginal utility of each good. hand side of the screen shows the subject's utility function, current holdings, and current 3 pay-off. It is also used to construct orders. The right-hand side shows a list of submitted 4 orders, some of which have already transacted. Subjects could submit limit orders to buy 5 and sell the commodities A and B with cash used as the medium of exchange. The price 6 of the last transaction was displayed but subjects could submit orders with any price. a list of the trades they made, and their total earnings from all completed periods.
Continuous double auction implementation

15
Figure 3. User interface for the continuous double auction market. The screen is from the point of view of a type-C agent who was endowed with cash and needs cash and good A. On the top left of the screen, the text beginning 'Payoff Formula' shows the subject's utility function and the value of the current holdings. Below this is a table with labeled rows for each of the goods. The column headed 'Price' shows the last trade price, 'Holdings' are the current holdings, 'Available' are current holdings which the subject is not currently offering to trade, 'Unused' are the current holdings that are not contributing towards earnings, and 'Excess' indicates similar information in words (in the screen shot, the subject has too much cash and not enough of good A, so can increase earnings by trading cash for good A). The columns 'I give' and 'I take' are used to construct orders. This is done by entering numbers in the columns. As numbers are entered, the 'Added Value' number automatically updates to show how earnings will change if the order transacts. The table on the right hand side shows the orders that have been submitted. There are currently two active orders. Trader 1 is offering to sell good B at a price of 25. Trader 2 (labeled 'Me') is offering to buy good A at a price of 45. There has been one transaction, the current subject bought three units of good A.
Schedule market implementation
1
A screenshot of the schedule market interface is shown in Figure 4a . Subjects con-2 structed a schedule by specifying how much they wanted to trade at each of a range of 3 prices. The range of prices was pre-determined and constant throughout the experiment.
4
The admissability restrictions were enforced automatically. When the subject changed 5 their demand at one price, if the restrictions were not satisfied, the computer adjusted 6 demands at other prices to satisfy the restrictions. For example, if demand was initially 7 zero at every price and the subject set demand at the highest price to one, the computer 8 would automatically set the demand at all lower prices to one to satisfy admissibility.
9
Interpolation was used to produce a continuous demand function from the quantities 10 specified by subjects at each of the pre-specified prices. Suppose a subject is endowed 11 with good A and demands good B. They specify their demand for B at pre-specified 12 prices, giving a list of (p, q B ) pairs. This is converted to a list of (p, q A ) pairs where 13 q A = q B p. Then the following interpolation is performed. Given two price-supply points
Interpolation is carried out using price-supply pairs rather than price demand 16 pairs so that intermediate points satisfy the admissibility conditions that ensures a unique 17 equilibrium. The interpolation was performed as subjects were entering the schedule and 18 subjects could see the interpolated points on the graphical representation of the schedule 19 before they submitted it. Although subjects could not directly specify demand at every 20 possible price, they could do so indirectly. For example, suppose a subject wanted to 21 demand a certain quantity at price 7, but the nearest pre-specified prices were 5 and 10.
By suitable adjustment of the quantities demanded at 5 and 10, they could specify the 23 desired quantity at price 7.
24
A period ended if all schedules had been submitted or if four minutes had elapsed.
25
The submitted schedules were summed to produce an aggregate demand function. A 26 numerical optimization procedure was applied to the aggregate demand function to find 27 the market clearing prices. Trade occurred at these prices with each agent trading the 28 quantities specified by their submitted schedule. Figure 4b shows the 'results screen' from 29 the schedule market shown after the period ended. Subjects were shown the demand 30 schedule they had submitted and the residual supply that they faced (the combinations 31 of price and quantity taken by the subject that would equalize supply and demand in all 32 markets).
33
Figure 4a. User interface for the schedule market. The left-hand side of the screen shows the subject's endowment, utility function, and a table that can be used to create demand schedules. The first column of the table is a fixed list of possible prices of the commodity that the subject needs in terms of the commodity with which the subject is endowed. In this case, the subject needs commodity A and has cash, so the price column shows the price of A measured in cash. The subject's task is to fill in numbers in the 'Take' column, representing their demand at each of the prices. As subjects enter numbers, the displayed graph and the relevant numbers in the table (the columns labeled 'Give', 'Holdings', 'Unused', and 'Value') are automatically updated to reflect their choices. The 'Give' column indicates how much subjects will give up for what they want to take at the specified price. The 'Holdings' column shows holdings after trading at each price. The 'Unused' column indicates whether any of the holdings will be unused, i.e. not contribute towards the subject's payoff. The 'Value' column shows the utility of the holdings at each price. The 'Undo' button lets subjects revert to previous states of the schedule, making it easy to correct mistakes and to experiment with different configurations. Once the subject had finished editing the schedule, they pressed 'Submit'. Once submitted, schedules could no longer be altered. The right-hand side of the screen shows a graphical representation of the schedule being constructed. It shows the quantities chosen at each of the listed prices and the interpolated quantities at intermediate prices. The green dot indicates the point being edited on the left-hand side (currently p = 4.44 and q = 7.25). The dotted curved grid lines represent the admissibility constraint. For a schedule to be admissible, as q increases, a schedule can only go to a lower grid line. 
Results
1
We compare the two market institutions in terms of price stability (Section 5.1), fourth double auction sessions in Figure 5 . 
where L is the Lyapunov function and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distri-8 bution. 22 The session-specific constant α s corresponds to the path's starting point (i.e. 2.2. The estimated β coefficient is significantly negative for the schedule market, see 23 
22
We introduce this transformation because the Lyapunov function is bounded between 0 and 1 so a simple linear regression would not be appropriate. Prices Equilibrium Price B Price A Figure 5 . Between-period prices in the double-auction market sessions (top six panels) and the schedule market sessions (bottom six panels). Prices cycle in a counter-clockwise manner in the double auction markets and converge straight to equilibrium in the schedule markets. price averages over all six sessions are p A = 40.6(0.6) and p B = 22.2(0.5).
12
The stark difference in price evolution under the two different market mechanisms is 
17
The pattern of the oscillations suggests that when one price crosses its equilibrium value 18 the other price is furthest from its equilibrium value, as the tatonnement model predicts
19
(see Figure 1a ). The bottom panel shows observed trade prices in the schedule market, The tatonnement model makes more specific predictions than the non-convergence 23 Angles were calculated using prices normalized so that the competitive equilibrium is (1, 1). Errors are measured in the clockwise direction. If the predicted direction is north and the observed direction is north east, the error is +45 degrees. If the predicted direction is north and the observed direction is west, the error is -90 degrees. Support. Consider the following simple regression, which explains price movements in 1 the A and B markets in terms of excess demand, as the tatonnement model predicts, 2 and straight convergence:
The results are shown in Table 4 . Note that only β tat is different from 0 in the double 4 auction market while only β conv is different from 0 in the schedule market.
5
For additional analysis concerning price dynamics in the double auction market we refer 6 the reader to the Appendix, which compares our results to those of the Anderson et al.
7
(2004) study who used only the double auction market. As discussed in the Appendix,
8
we replicate all the findings that pertain to their "cycling " treatment I that we used 9 for our double auction market experiments. Our main interest is in comparing the two 10 market institutions, in particular, how price (in)stability affects outcomes in terms of 11 efficiency and equality. Table 4 . Explaining the direction of price changes using the tatonnement model and a model of straight convergence. In the double auction market, price changes are driven only by excess demands as the tatonnement model predicts. Prices in the schedule market are not affected by excess demands but instead converge along a straight line to the equilibrium. Prices are normalized so that the competitive equilibrium is (1, 1) and excess demand for a good is normalized by dividing by the total quantity of that good in the economy. Standard errors are in parentheses; * * * indicates p < 0.001.
The effects of price (in)stability on market performance
1 This section models the allocations and hence welfare that results from trading at non- ratios determined by the prices until they hold equal proportions of the goods they want.
9
Of course, if prices are out of equilibrium, not all traders are able to achieve a balanced 10 portfolio of the goods they want. The market does not clear and some traders are left 11 with "unused" goods. However, traders of at least one type will have goods in the desired 12 proportions, making the outcome Pareto optimal and hence no further trade possible.
13
To derive predictions for the price-taking model, consider the original Scarf economy 14 of Section 2. Let (p A , p B , p C = 1) denote the price vector and let (q A , q B , q C ) denote the 15 quantities traded at these prices.
16
Proposition 6. For the original Scarf economy, the price-taking model predicts that the 17 quantities traded are
and the resulting welfare is Welfare is maximized at the competitive equilibrium prices, p A = p B = 1.
1
In the market for A, type A sells good A to type C. Type C pays using cash from their Welfare is taken to be the sum of each type's utility. The motivation for this for-10 mulation, given that in the Scarf economy preferences are not quasi linear, is as follows.
11
First, given the symmetry between agent's utility functions it seems natural to give the We define market efficiency as the fraction of the total gains from trade that are When starting from the Scarf economy endowments, there is one agent supplying and demanding each of the goods and trade can continue until one agent achieves goods in the desired proportions. 25 The coefficient for correlation between the predicted and observed period averages is 0.770 (p < 0.0001).
26 Two sessions resulted in almost identical and observed efficiency levels, which is why it appears as Result 4. In the double auction market, observed efficiency is 77%. In the 1 schedule market, observed efficiency is significantly higher: 95%. 72.0%, 86.6%, 71.7%, 81.5%. Note that all six efficiency levels for the schedule market 5 are higher, so the null hypothesis that efficiency levels are the same can be rejected 6 (p = 0.0022, Median test).
7
We next determine how the total gains from trade are divided among the different types 8 of agents. Using the price-taking model of Proposition 6 together with the opening prices for the 11 period we can predict the gains from trade by agent type in the double auction market.
12
if there are only five large filled diamonds. 27 If all goods are randomly assigned to one type of trader, predicted efficiency is W min = 1. A stricter definition of efficiency that corrects for this baseline level would be
The normalized efficiency of the double auction market is 31% and that of the schedule market 85%. in Figure 9 ). The tendency of type-A agents to stock up on too much cash benefits 8 the type-C agent, which explains why their observed gains are somewhat higher than 9 predicted (as indicated by the squares in Figure 9 ).
10
Notwithstanding these small discrepancies, Figure 9 does a remarkable job at ex- sessions (bottom six panels). 28 The white space at the top of each panel indicates the 19 degree to which there was a loss in efficiency.
20
Result 5. The double auction market results in large inequalities. In con-21 trast, the schedule market results in approximately equal payoffs.
22
Support. The division of the total gains from trade among the three types of agent 23 
28
Recall that in the double auction market Session 2 there were only 10 periods due to a computer crash. arrive at Pareto efficient allocations as well as the prices that define the terms of exchange.
10
The assumptions underlying the theory are that agents maximize their utility at given 11 prices, i.e. price-taking behavior, and that prices are such that no good is in excess 12 demand or supply, i.e. prices are market clearing.
13
Despite its powerful mathematical structure and broad applicability, general equilib- this strong assumption, prices may cycle forever thus precluding trade from occurring.
20
In other words, prices are globally unstable in Scarf's economy, which is perpetually out 21 of equilibrium.
22
This prediction suggests that the Scarf economy forms an ideal test for general equi- he deemed to be one of the great problems for the 21st century (Smale, 1998) . Specifically, In the schedule market, price-taking behavior takes the form of submitting a "com-26 petitive schedule," i.e. a set of quantities that are utility maximizing taking prices as 27 given. We prove that price-taking behavior is a weakly dominant strategy (see Propo- We also test the schedule market in the laboratory and find that it performs ex- Importantly, the schedule market is able to translate price stability into improved per-37 formance: observed efficiency is 95% (compared to 77% in the double auction market) 38 and outcomes are highly egalitarian (see Figure 11 ). Besides the desirable theoretical 39 properties and the excellent performance in our empirical tests, schedule markets are also 40 practical. Electricity markets and treasury auctions allow for schedules, which are also 41 used to determine opening prices for the day on the New York Stock Exchange.
42
Our results thus have implications for market design that extend beyond the Scarf 43 economy. Nowadays, variants of the tatonnement institution are frequently used in auc-44 tions to privatize major public assets. For instance, in the FCC's simultaneous ascending auction, the price of items for which demand exceeds supply is increased until there is 1 no more excess demand. Submitting demand schedules could be an alternative to the 2 iterative adjustment of prices. Univariate functions can be used for schedules in cases 3 (like our experiment) where each trader desires to exchange one type of good for another.
4
Vector functions can be used in cases where traders demand a number of different goods.
5
Our experimental results demonstrate that in settings with complementarities and in-6 come effects, an institution whose price adjustments approximate tatonnement dynamics 7 does not necessarily result in competitive equilibrium outcomes while a call market that 8 admits schedules does.
9
Appendix A. The schedule market without the admissibility restriction
10
Without the admissibility restriction, submitting a competitive schedule is optimal 11 when others behave competitively. In other words, all agents submitting competitive 12 schedules constitutes a Nash equilibrium even when we drop the admissibility restric-13 tion.
14 Proposition A1. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, it is a Nash 15 equilibrium for all agents to submit a competitive schedule.
16
Proof. Consider the type-A agents. When the type-B and type-C agents submit com-17 petitive schedules the supply of B in terms of A will be one-to-one, i.e. for every q units andD AC (p t−1 , p) respectively, then prices will converge to the unique competitive equi-27 librium of the economy over successive periods.
28
Proof. The supply scheduleŜ YX (p t−1 , q) = qD 
It is readily verified that p A = p B = 1 is the unique rest point, or equilibrium, of the 3 system (Equation B.1). Note that for α = 1, prices converge to equilibrium in one 4 iteration and that the dynamical system for α > 1 is identical to that for 1/α < 1 with The left panel of Figure B1 shows a typical phase portrait for the system (Equation
9
B.1) when α > 1. The upward sloping thin curve corresponds to price pairs where p does not change. Their unique intersection corresponds to the equilibrium point (1, 1).
12
The arrows indicate the direction of price changes in each of the four regions. The type of 13 price dynamics that is consistent with this phase portrait is (i) convergence to the unique 14 equilibrium, (ii) a limit cycle around the unique equilibrium, or (iii) divergence of prices.
In the latter two cases, the unique equilibrium has to be locally unstable. cycles inwards to the unique equilibrium in a clockwise fashion.
7
The right panel of Figure A1 shows the phase portrait, the curves that define no 
18
The first result concerns changes in average prices between periods. as own-market excess demand.
21
We replicate this result. Following Anderson et al, the excess demand in each market 22 was computed using the average prices in period t. The sign of the excess demand was of excess demand is less than 10 −6 .
28
The second result concerns whether prices converge to the competitive equilibrium prices. Table C1 . Estimating a more general price adjustment model using between-period price changes. Prices are normalized so that the competitive equilibrium is (1, 1) and excess demand for a good is normalized by dividing by the total quantity of that good in the economy. Standard errors are in parentheses; * indicates p < 0.05, * * indicates p < 0.01. hypothesis that movements into each of the four quadrants are equally likely).
16
The next result pertaining to the cycling treatment concerns price changes within periods 17 rather than between periods and compares three models of price adjustment. Table C2 . Trade-to-trade sign test results based on within-period prices. For parts (II) and (III), the null hypothesis that the sign of the price change is correctly predicted with probability 0.5 is tested against a two-sided alternative. * indicates p < 0.05, * * indicates p < 0.01, * * * indicates p < 0.001.
We replicate a slightly stronger versions of these results. We find that the simple con- 
